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ABSTRACT 
GAME-FRAMING COGNITIVE ASSESSMENTS TO IMPROVE APPLICANT 
PERCEPTIONS 
 
Andrew Burnett Collmus 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. Richard N. Landers 
 
 
Research has shown that although cognitive testing is key to quality hiring, applicants 
often react poorly to cognitive ability tests. Applicant reactions theory indicates that time-length 
judgments of a selection procedure can affect applicant perceptions. It was thus hypothesized 
that game-framing, the act of labeling something a game without changing the content, would 
cause participants to perceive that time was moving faster while completing a battery of 
cognitive ability tests.  Similarly, it was expected that game-framing would increase test 
motivation and decrease test anxiety. Perceived length was tested as a mediator for the effects of 
game-framing on test anxiety and on test motivation. Structural equation modeling was used to 
evaluate the hypothesized relationships. In the observed dataset, game-framing caused decreases 
in perceived length, perceived length was positively related to test motivation, and perceived 
length mediated the relationship between game-framing and test motivation. The results of this 
study demonstrate that game-framing affects time perceptions. This finding has implications for 
gamification researchers, namely, that game-framing effects should be measured and accounted 
for in future studies. Furthermore, applicant reactions theorists have suggested that perceived 
time length is a key variable in the overall applicant reactions model, and this study is the first to 
empirically investigate perceived time length of a selection procedure in this context. Results 
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General cognitive ability has been found to be a consistent predictor of job performance 
across jobs (Schmidt, Oh & Shaffer, 2013); however, applicants often react poorly to cognitive 
ability tests used in employee selection (Gilliland, 1993). This has been the general state of the 
literature for decades.  General cognitive ability has been conclusively demonstrated to be the 
best individual predictor of job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and its predictive 
validity increases as the criterion job’s task complexity increases (Hunter, 1986). Yet research 
has also consistently shown that cognitive ability tests are rated less favorably than resumes, 
work samples, and interviews (Gilliland, 1993; Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004; Anderson, 
Salgado, & Hülsheger, 2010). The same body of research has shown that poor reactions can lead 
to applicant withdrawal (Ryan, Sacco, McFarland, & Kriska, 2000), which reduces the utility of 
a selection system. Other outcomes of poor applicant reactions include decreased organizational 
attraction and offer acceptance intentions, and an increase in litigation intentions.  
According to applicant reactions (AR) theory, such poor reactions to cognitive ability 
tests can be explained by poor perceived procedure characteristics and applicant perceptions, 
including increased perceived test length, decreased motivation to test, and increased test anxiety 
(Hausknecht et al., 2004).  Perceived procedure characteristics are constructs that represent how 
applicants perceived various aspects of the selection procedure. Perceived length is one such 
characteristic.  Such characteristic theoretically cause changes in broader applicant perceptions, 
including test anxiety and test motivation.  Thus, the existing AR literature suggests that changes 
in perceived length of process should correspond to changes in test anxiety and test motivation. 
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Given this theoretical framework, presenting cognitive ability assessments to test-takers 
as if they were games, a test modification called “game-framing,” can be theoretically linked to 
improved reactions. Game-framing is a type of framing, which refers to a change in the way 
information is presented to impact the manner in which it is perceived. Game-framing in 
particular is intended to modify perceptions of a task or process to make it seem more game-like, 
making it a type of gamification (Armstrong, Landers, & Collmus, 2015). In the terms of the 
framing literature, game-framing is a type of attribute framing, which refers to a change intended 
to modify the attractiveness of a task or item (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). When a 
cognitive ability test is game-framed, it is in part intended to encourage people to get lost in the 
game so that they perceive time is moving faster. Thus, the general goal of this paper is to 
demonstrate that when cognitive ability tests are framed as games, test-takers perceive less time 
passes during testing, causing increases in motivation to complete the assessment and decreases 
in anxiety.  
Although AR theory provides a general picture as to which individual perceptions and 
attitudes might change as a result of game-framing, the specific mechanisms are currently 
unknown and therefore represent a gap in the current literature. That is, AR literature describes 
the nomological net of reactions to selection procedures but does not provide many practical 
recommendations on how to modify selection practices to improve actual reactions (Ryan & 
Huth, 2008), especially in the context of game-framing.  To fill this gap, the goal of this research 
theoretically is to extend AR theory by proposing and empirically supporting the direct effects 
and mediational processes for the impact of game-framing on applicant perceptions as described 




Applicant Reactions Theory 
AR theory describes antecedents, moderators, and outcomes related to applicant 
perceptions of selection procedures. Antecedents of applicant perceptions include person 
characteristics, such as personality and race, job characteristics, perceived procedure 
characteristics, and organizational context (Hausknecht et al., 2004). Outcomes of applicant 
reactions include such things as organizational attractiveness, which affects job pursuit or offer 
acceptance intentions, likelihood and success of litigation against the hiring organization, and 
validity and utility (Smither, Reilly, Millsap, Pearlman, & Stoffey, 1993). Stage in the selection 
process, job desirability, and available alternatives, among other processes, moderate the 
relationship between applicant perceptions and outcomes (Hausknecht et al., 2004). 
Organizational justice theory is the foundation of AR theory, although it has been extended to 
include other theoretical mechanisms. In two seminal AR papers, Gilliland (1993) and Smither et 
al. (1993), both proposed that organizational justice perceptions are the link between selection 
procedures and various outcomes. That is, perceptions of fairness explain the link between a 
given selection procedure and a candidate’s likeliness to withdrawal from the application 
process, recommend the organization to friends and colleagues, reapply to the organization, 
accept an offer, or other outcomes in AR literature. In recent years, as AR theory has expanded to 
include new antecedents and moderators beyond those that are traditionally found in the 
organizational justice literature (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2004; Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). Such 
additional variables now include, stage in the selection process, industry norms, job norms, 
market conditions (e.g., unemployment and job availability), individual characteristics (e.g., 




According to AR theory, applicant perceptions are the focal processes involved in AR. 
Applicant perceptions are a class of variables that are the core mediator between antecedents and 
outcomes in the AR model and include procedural justice, distributive justice, test anxiety, test 
motivation, attitudes toward tests, and attitudes toward selection, among others (Hausknecht et 
al., 2004). These constructs describe internal thoughts or feelings that buffer the effects of 
applicant reactions and perceptions on outcomes. Of particular note in AR theory in relation to 
game-framing are two particular perceptions: test anxiety and test motivation. Test anxiety is a 
situational state that is in part related to fear of negative evaluation (Hembree, 1988). Test 
motivation is an applicant perception that describes the level of effort one is willing to put forth 
on a given test. According to Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager (1993) three factors 
comprise task motivation: (1) the choice to exert effort, (2) the intensity and (3) duration effort to 
put forth. In a similar vein, test motivation can be conceptualized as the combination of choice, 
intensity, and duration of effort one is willing to put forth in a test as well as the level of desire 
one has to achieve a maximal outcome.  
Perceived procedure characteristics are theorized to be direct antecedents to applicant 
perceptions, and of particular interest to those considering game-framing is perceived length of 
process. Ryan and Ployhart (2000) suggested that if selection processes are perceived as too 
lengthy, it may be demotivating to applicants; however, I could identify no empirical evidence 
supporting this relationship. The relationship between perceived length and test anxiety appears 
to be similarly untested.  Research on time perceptions more broadly demonstrates several 
different ways that individuals perceive time and time passage. In general, there are two high-
level subjective time perceptions: interval length estimation and passage of time judgments. The 
former is typically assessed by interval estimation (e.g., “estimate in minutes and seconds the 
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length of the experience”), whereas the latter is typically assessed by speed perceptions on a 
likert type scale (e.g., from 1 = time dragged to 5 = time flew; Sucala, Scheckner, and David, 
2011). Time estimations come in two varieties, prospective and retrospective (Wearden, 2005). 
In prospective estimation, participants know ahead of time that they will be estimating time 
passage. In retrospective estimation, it is only after a task is completed that participants become 
aware that they are to estimate the subjective passage of time. This distinction has 
methodological implications and is therefore explained further in a later section. 
General Cognitive Ability 
Human cognitive ability is a hierarchical construct consisting of one general factor  
(g) at the highest level, operationalized as the shared variance between a variety of cognitively-
loaded tasks (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004). Contemporary intelligence theorists generally 
ascribe to a 3-stratum theory of intelligence. The second-order dimensions of g are typically 
specified as fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, general memory and learning, broad 
visual perception, broad auditory perception, broad retrieval ability, broad cognitive speediness, 
and processing speed (Carroll, 1993, p. 626). Each of those constructs can also be conceptualized 
as consisting of even more specific dimensions, such as reading speed, spelling ability, or 
quantitative reasoning (Carroll, 1993). At each level of the g hierarchy, variables exhibit positive 
manifold (i.e., they correlate positively). The property of positive manifold means that different 
cognitive ability assessments, using different assessment tasks, can be used to infer g (e.g., 
Wonderlic, WAIS, Shipley’s, Stanford-Binet); Spearman referred to this as indifference of the 
indicator.  
Cognitive ability is well-established as a consistent predictor of job performance in a 
variety of contexts. Additionally, g predicts proclivity to learn new tasks. Thus, g is the single 
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best differentiator of complex task performance – those high in g will learn new tasks more 
quickly and be able to perform mastered tasks at a higher level than those who are lower in g. In 
additional to theoretical soundness, these assertions are backed by nearly a century of empirical 
data collected in organizations and academic settings (Kuncel et al., 2004; Schmidt & Hunter, 
2004). 
Because applicant reactions to cognitive ability tests are generally poorer than to 
resumes, work samples, and interviews (Anderson et al., 2010; Gilliland 1993) in the United 
States, such tests are a prime target for an intervention to improve reactions. More specifically, 
since g is the apparent single best predictor of job performance, it would benefit organizations 
most if it was also the one most preferred by applicants. Since this is not the case, there is room 
to improve applicant reactions to tests of g.  
Cognitive ability tests themselves are prime candidates for game-framing. Specific 
definitions of g abound, but researchers generally agree that it consists of the ability to reason, 
think abstractly, solve problems, and acquire new knowledge (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988, p. 
56). As a reflection of that, many cognitive assessment tasks require mental object rotation 
(similar to a puzzle), or applied logic (similar to riddles). Thus, since many cognitive 
assessments are similar to existing leisure games (e.g., puzzles and riddles), the presentation of 
these assessments as games should be highly believable. In other words, the questions commonly 
seen on cognitive assessments naturally lend themselves to game-framing.  
Cognitive ability tests have previously been presented as games or puzzles by researchers 
to affect perceptions of the testing situation, although the effects of this presentation have not 
been studied in the context of personnel selection. For example, Buford and O’Leary (2015) used 
performance in Portal 2, a puzzle and problem solving video game, to predict scores on several 
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measures of fluid intelligence. They found strong positive correlations between Portal 2 
performance and Raven’s Progressive Matrices (r = .49, p < .001) and Shipley-2 Block Pattern (r 
= .49, p < .001). Rather than using off-the-shelf video games, such as Portal 2, other researchers 
have created video games with the express purpose of assessing intelligence. For example, 
Delgado, Uribe, Alonso and Diaz (2016) created a battery of assessment games, which tended to 
correlate strongly with subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III) 
between r = .43 and r = .60 (these correlations represent those between a given game in the 
assessment battery and its intended corresponding WISC-III subscale). However, since 
assessment games are a method, rather than a construct, there is variability in their efficacy as 
measurement instruments. As another example, McPherson and Burns (2008, Table 7) reported 
lower correlations for two games designed to assess g and working memory, between r = .44 and 
r = .22 (this range includes significant correlations between an assessment game and another 
intelligence instrument, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices). These examples demonstrate that 
in some cases, the line between game and cognitive ability test is unclear. Given this, I contend 
that some cognitive ability tests, especially those already containing game-like features, could be 
readily perceived as games if presented as such.  
Gamification 
Gamification involves the use of game elements to shape behaviors, perceptions, or 
psychological states. Game elements are attributes of games that differentiate them from normal 
tasks. Garris, Ahlers, and Driskell (2002) list six game elements that differentiate games from 
simulations, fantasy, rules/goals, sensory stimuli, challenge, mystery, and control. More recently, 
Wilson et al. (2008) listed 19 different game elements found in learning games. Game elements 
can exist explicitly within the game’s programming or implicitly within the mind of the player 
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(Collmus, Armstrong, and Landers, 2016). A standalone game (e.g., a console video game), 
contains many game elements. Gamification represents the spectrum between a standalone game 
and a mundane or serious task; as more game elements are added, the task becomes more game-
like. A ubiquitous example of gamification within organizations is the use of leaderboards to 
create an atmosphere of competition related to job performance (Landers, Bauer, & Callan, 
2015). In this context, leaderboards are intended to affect motivation, which is in turn expected 
to increase the actual desired behavior, job performance. 
Previous psychological research has in fact demonstrated that one type of gamification, 
game-framing, can affect performance on intelligence tests, although this was not the intended 
purpose of that research. Steele and Aronson (study 1, 1995) sought to investigate potential 
causes of racial group differences on intelligence test scores. They administered a 30-item test, 
composed of difficult GRE verbal items, to three different groups. Group 1 was told that the test 
was diagnostic of verbal ability, that the purpose of the research was to investigate individual 
differences related to reading and verbal abilities, and that they would be provided their results to 
better understand their own strengths and weaknesses related to verbal problem solving; these 
participants were told to put forth a strong effort in order to help the researchers analyze their 
verbal ability. Group 2 was told that the research was intended to better understand the 
psychological factors of verbal problem solving; the study description did not mention verbal 
ability, and the participants were told that performance feedback would be provided to better 
familiarize them with the type of questions they will be seeing on future tests (presumably in the 
next few years of undergraduate education). Group 3 had similar treatment to Group 2, except 
they were told that the exercise was a mental challenge, and the purpose of the research was to 
investigate the problem solving process; again, verbal ability was not mentioned to the 
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participants in this condition. The authors reported a significant main effect, F(2, 107) = 4.74, p 
< .02 in which participants in the challenge condition performed higher than participants in the 
diagnostic and non-diagnostic conditions (i.e., Group 3 outperformed Groups 1 and 2). Thus, 
although these researchers were not explicitly measuring game-framing, the results from study 1 
showed that higher scores on a cognitive ability test (GRE Verbal) were obtained by presenting 
the test as a challenge, rather than as a test of ability. 
Research in other areas of social science also suggests that game-framing should have an 
effect on perceptions. For example, it has been shown that test-takers rated a gamified survey as 
more enjoyable than the non-gamified version. Downes-Le Guin, Baker, Mechling, and Ruyle 
(2012) found that as more game elements were added to a survey, the survey was rated 
increasingly enjoyable by respondents. Mavletova (2014) found similar effects in an adolescent 
sample when her gamified survey was rated as more enjoyable than the non-gamified version. 
Thus, empirical evidence indicates that game elements can improve the test-taking experience 
from the respondent’s perspective.  
Previous research in gamification demonstrates motivational effects when describing 
tasks as games to research participants. Lieberoth (2015) randomly assigned participants to three 
conditions: core task, game-framed task, and game mechanics task. The core task in this study 
was a facilitated small group discussion of written cues in which the participants rated each 
response from one to five stars, five stars being the best rating. The participants in each group 
took turns reading the prompt and facilitating discussion. The game-framed task utilized a game 
board and pawns, in which the prompts were read from cardboard game cards. The participants 
in each group would take turns reading the prompts, as before, and then would move their pawn 
one space forward on the game board. Although this condition had the initial appearance of a 
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game, many game elements necessary to classify the task as a “game” were missing. 
Specifically, each turn the facilitator moved their pawn forward once space, with no regard to the 
discussion content or its rating.  Thus, performance was not contingent on any actions under the 
players’ control, a defining aspect of games. In the full game condition, participants took turns 
reading prompts in their groups as before but would also move their pawn forward a number of 
spaces that corresponded to the group’s rating of the facilitated discussion. They were also given 
a game objective to reach the end of the board first. Thus, participants in this condition had a 
game with rules that they could win by facilitating better discussions when it was their turn. 
Lieberoth reported significantly higher interest/enjoyment ratings in the game-framing (M = 
3.247, SD = 0.854, p < .007) and full game (M = 3.366, SD = 0.596, p < .001) conditions than in 
the non-game condition (M = 2.602, SD = 0.614). Although this lends some initial support to the 
existence of a game framing effect, because framing was accompanied by the addition of a game 
board and game pieces, the game framing effect measured is confounded with any effect of those 
game elements, limiting the interpretability of this study in regards to framing in particular.  
Framing 
More broadly, it has been demonstrated that framing can modify human thought and 
decision-making processes in significant ways.  Tversky and Kahneman (1981) provide an 
example of the classic risky choice paradigm. In their study, the choice-makers (participants) 
were asked to decide which course of action to pursue in the face of a hypothetical disease 
outbreak that is expected to kill 600 people. In the first condition, participants could choose 
between two options. In Program A, 200 people would be saved, whereas in Program B, there 
was a 1 in 3 chance that 600 will be saved and a 2 in 3 chance that no people will be saved. In 
the second condition, the choice was reframed as Program A, in which 400 people would die, or 
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Program B, in which there is a 1 in 3 possibility that no one will die and a 2 in 3 possibility that 
600 people will die. Although worded differently, the choices presented to the two groups were 
objectively identical in result probabilistically. However, the change in wording corresponded to 
a change in the choice that participants were likely to make. More specifically, the change in 
wording corresponds with a change in majority preference from the risk-averse option to the 
risk-taking option (in this case, risk-averse defines the choice that guarantees lives will be saved, 
while risk-taking defines the choice in which there is a possibility that no lives will be saved). 
When the choice is framed as an opportunity to guarantee 200 lives will be saved, the majority of 
participants chose that option. When the choice is framed as a guarantee that 400 lives will be 
lost, the majority of participants made the alternate choice.  
One particular type of framing, attribute framing, should be of interest to gamification 
researchers due to its relative simplicity in implementation. Attribute framing involves framing 
object or event characteristics to modify its attractiveness (Levin, Schneider, Gaeth, 1998). As an 
example, Levin and Gaeth (1988) found that when beef was labeled “75% lean” it was rated as 
better tasting than when the same beef was labeled “25% fat”, thus demonstrating the effects of 
framing on human perception; specifically, the way something is presented can make it seem 
more appealing. This type of framing is a bit simpler than examples demonstrated via the risky 
choice paradigm and thus may be applicable in a wider variety of situations. However, much like 
risky choice framing, the meaning or content is identical but the presentation is different. 
Hypotheses 
Since theory and empirical evidence demonstrate that framing can affect perceptions of a 
choice, task, or item, I contend that game-framing cognitive assessments should make those 
assessments seem more gamelike to test-takers. In other words, because framing can be used to 
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influence perceptions in other contexts, game-framing should influence perceptions in the 
present context. Specifically, the goal of game-framing cognitive ability assessments is to 
encourage participants to accept the idea that they are completing puzzles and riddles rather than 
a cognitive ability assessment. 
 When individuals are highly engaged in an activity, their time perceptions are altered 
(Gable & Poole, 2012). During fun experiences, such as games, time seems to move more 
quickly (Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse, and Sackett, 2010). Previous studies have shown 
that gamified surveys are perceived as more engaging, evidenced by perceptions of test length 
and enjoyment in comparison to nongamified tests or surveys (Downes-Le Guin et al., 2012; 
Lieberoth, 2015; Mavletova, 2014). Therefore, since game-elements can cause a survey to seem 
more enjoyable, and enjoyable activities seem to take less time, the first hypothesis follows. 
Hypothesis 1. Game-framed cognitive tests will have lower perceived length than those 
same tests when assessment-framed. 
Prior research (e.g., Downes-Le Guin et al., 2012; Lieberoth 2015; Mavletova, 2014) 
demonstrates that gamification may improve motivational factors related to test-taking, and also 
that reactions to cognitive ability tests, of which motivation is a key component (Hausknecht et 
al., 2004), are poor relative to their standing as an excellent predictor of performance (Anderson 
et al., 2010). Therefore, the use of game-framing with cognitive ability tests is likely to improve 
the motivational component of applicant reactions. 
Hypothesis 2. Participants will report higher test motivation for game-framed cognitive 
ability tests than those same tests when assessment-framed. 
Because test anxiety is in part due to fear of negative evaluation (Hembree, 1988), 
assessments framed as a puzzle-game rather than as an evaluation of ability should additionally 
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invoke fewer internal thoughts and emotions that result from comparing oneself to others or 
worrying about test results. The results of research by Steele and Aronson (1995) suggest that 
game-framed cognitive tests are perceived as less evaluative. In their diagnostic condition, in 
which the tests were presented as ability assessment tools, 65% of participants believed that the 
purpose of the study was to evaluate their abilities. In the game-framed condition, in which these 
tests were presented as a challenge, only 11% of participants believed the purpose of the study 
was to evaluate their abilities. 
Hypothesis 3. Participants will report lower test anxiety (the measured aspect of test 
anxiety) for game-framed cognitive ability tests than those same tests when assessment-framed.  
Theory and research suggest a link between time perceptions and motivation. Campbell 
et al, (1993) describe duration of effort as a key part of motivation. Thus, as time seemingly 
moves faster or slower, the duration of effort choice should, respectively, last longer or shorter in 
actual time. As would be expected from Campbell and colleagues’ theory of task motivation, 
metacognition researchers have found a relationship between motivation and faster time 
perception (Gable & Poole, 2012). Furthermore, meta-analytically derived estimates of the 
relationship between perceived procedure characteristic variables and applicant perception 
variables are moderately positive; 21 meta-analyses of the various relationships between these 
variable classes provided average effects ranging from .14 to .54 (Hausknecht et al., 2004). 
Hypothesis 4. Perceived length will be negatively correlated with test motivation 
A component of test anxiety is the tendency to ruminate on one’s standing relative to 
others’ performance (Lievens et al., 2003). Consequentially, test-takers who perceive that time is 
moving quickly will also perceive less time to ruminate, resulting in lowered perceptions of 
anxiety. This relationship is also suggested by applicant reactions theorists (e.g., Hausknecht et 
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al., 2004; Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). Meta-analytic results between perceived procedure 
characteristics and applicant perceptions range from .14 to .54 (Hausknecht et al., 2004); 
however, since anxiety is not a positive outcome it is expected that the relationship will be 
negative, but of similar size. It is furthermore worth noting that since time perceptions are 
implied by theory but not empirically tested, this range of meta-analytic estimates (i.e., from 
Hausknecht et al., 2004) is the best existing data from which to calibrate hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Hypothesis 5. Perceived length will be positively correlated with test anxiety 
Finally, tests of the indirect effects of game-framing on reactions (test motivation and test 
anxiety) via time perceptions will be tested. Specifically, applicant reactions models (e.g., 
Hausknecht et al., 2004; Ryan & Ployhart, 2000) dictate that the selection procedure 
characteristics organizations can control, such as game-framing, affect applicant perceptions as a 
function of their intermediary effect on perceived procedure characteristics. In the AR model, 
perceived procedure characteristics represent an antecedent class of variable in the AR model, 
whereas applicant perceptions are the central class of variable. In contextualizing gamification in 
general and game-framing specifically to the AR context, the present study therefore proposes 
that the relationship between game-framing and the two applicant perceptions described earlier is 
mediated by the perceived procedure characteristic perceived length. 
Hypothesis 6. Perceived length will mediate the relationship between game-framing and 
test motivation. 






















In total, 358 participants were recruited for the study. A power analysis was conducted 
based upon a previous game-framing effect study (Lieberoth, 2015; η2 = 0.197), which   
indicated that 206 participants would be required to detect the effect using a Pearson’s 
correlation. Due to expected incompletions or other bad data, around 350 participants were 
recruited in order to achieve the 206 number of usable data points indicated by power analysis. 
Additional participants for the present study were also required in order to test the structural 
theoretical model with structural equation modeling (SEM). Participants were recruited via 
MTurk and paid $1.75 to participate. 
After data cleaning, the final sample (see Careless Respondent section in Ch. 3) consisted 
of 336 individuals, of whom 30 (8.9%) self-identified as African American or Black, 2 (0.6%) as 
Arab American, 17 (5.1%) as Asian American, 257 (76.5%) as European American or White, 2 
(.6%) as Native American or Native Alaskan, 1 (.3%) as Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian, 10 
(3.0%) as Other (single race), and 17 (5.1%) self-identified as Two or more races. One-Hundred 
and Sixty (47.6%) self-identified as male, while the remainder self-identified as female. Seven 
participants (2.1%) were ages 65 and older, while 329 (97.9%) were in 18-64 age range. Two-
Hundred and Eighty participants (83.3%) were employed either full (N = 225; 67.0%) or part-




Materials and Measures 
Cognitive ability tests. The following five cognitive ability tests were obtained from the 
International Cognitive Ability Resource Team (ICAR, 2014): Three Dimensional Rotation, 
Letter and Number Series, Matrix Reasoning, Progressive Matrices, and Verbal Reasoning. Items 
from these tests can be found in Appendices A through E, respectively. Condon and Revelle 
(2014) conducted a series of validity tests regarding the ICAR items. Specifically, they 
investigated the factor structure of each test and also of the overall battery and verified the 
presence of an emergent g factor. In addition, Condon and Revelle also sought validation of the 
ICAR items against a commercially available intelligence assessment, finding corrected 
correlations between the 16-item ICAR sample test and Shipley-2 composites A and B of 0.82 
and 0.81, respectively.   
Game-framing.  Game-framing, the experimental IV, was dummy coded such that 0 
represents the assessment frame and 1 represents game frame.   
Time length. Time estimations come in two varieties, prospective and retrospective 
(Wearden, 2005). In prospective estimation, participants know ahead of time that they will be 
estimating time passage. In retrospective estimation, it is only after a task is completed that 
participants become aware that they are to estimate the subjective passage of time. This 
distinction has important bearings for research methodology, namely, that retrospective time 
estimation can only occur once in a given study. Once individuals are given a time estimation 
prompt, they are unable to avoid thinking about the passage of time (Wearden, 2005). This 
discrepancy in thought creates a bifurcation between the first and any subsequent time 
estimations. Thus, to obtain multiple time estimations from the same individuals in a given study, 
one must stick to prospective estimation or adopt the methodology recommended by Hicks 
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(1992) in which participants are provided with cues and asked to make retrospective judgments 
of multiple events all at once. That is, after the study completed, participants were asked to 
provide subjective time estimations for several different events that occurred during the study. 
Time length estimation was assessed using the interval-length estimation procedure 
described by Sucala et al. (2011).  Participants were asked to “estimate, in minutes and seconds, 
the length of the experience”. An example answer was provided that read “e.g., 6:20 equals six 
minutes and twenty seconds”.  
Applicant perceptions. Applicant perceptions were measured with two subscales of the 
Test Attitude Survey described by Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, and Martin (1990). The Test 
Attitude Survey consists of 9 dimensions, including a 10-item test motivation scale (α = .85) and 
a 10-item comparative anxiety scale (α = .80). These two scales were used in the study. The full 
45-item TAS scale can be found in Appendix F. 
Demographics. A brief demographic questionnaire asked participants to report their age, 
gender identity, racial identity, and employment status. If a participant indicated current 
employment, it was requested that the participant indicate their industry, tenure, and current 
hours worked per week. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from MTurk’s online platform. Within the MTurk interface, 
the study was titled Problem Solving. The study description read “this is part of a university 
study on human problem solving.” After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were 
randomly placed into either the game-frame or the assessment-frame condition via a random 
number generator in the Qualtrics survey platform. In the assessment-frame condition, 
participants were asked to complete the cognitive ability measures with the following 
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instructions: “This research is part of a larger effort to understand adult cognitive functioning. 
You will complete a series of intelligence tests, similar to those used in IQ assessment. Please 
follow the instructions on each task, and make your best effort to select the correct response”.  
Participants in the game-frame conditions were given different instructions but otherwise 
experience identical stimuli: “This research is part of a larger effort to understand how humans 
solve puzzles, logic games, and riddles. You will be completing a series of puzzles and logic 
games. Please follow the instructions on each task, and make your best effort to select the correct 
response.” Participants then completed all cognitive tests, followed by time-length estimation, 







Handling of Cases Exhibiting Careless Responding  
Careless responding has an adverse effect on the interpretation of survey results because 
those observed responses do not reflect the constructs intended by the researcher (Meade & 
Craig, 2012). Recently, methodologists (e.g., DeSimone, Harms, & DeSimone, 2015; Meade & 
Craig, 2012) have recommended the use of Mahalanobis distance (MD) to identify multivariate 
outliers, because extreme MD values, which reflects multivariate outlyingness, can signal 
careless survey response patterns. When using this technique, an MD value for each scale within 
each case is calculated by regressing the scale mean onto its item scores and saving the MD 
values resulting from that analysis. These MD values follow a chi-square distribution, in which 
the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of items in that scale (McLaughlan, 1999). Given 
this, a p-value can be calculated for each MD value and therefore each scale.  Thus, for the 
cognitive ability and test attitude scales, an MD and accompanying p-value was calculated for 
each participant on each scale based on their response patterns within the scale. As an exception, 
the MD values for 3D Rotation were not used in screening calculations because that scale proved 
exceptionally difficult for participants. Forty-six percent of respondents (N = 164) did not answer 
a single 3D Rotation item correctly. Thus, higher MD values on this scale may have indicated 
astute participants rather than careless responders. Individuals who had 2 or more significant MD 
values (N = 22) were removed from further analyses. After the cleaning procedure, hypothesis 






The model depicted in Figure 1, including all direct and indirect effects, was tested with 
structural equation modeling using Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2015) with a slight 
modification. After revisiting Arvey et al. (1990), it was determined that the anxiety and 
motivation scales should be allowed to covary, and this lack of covariance was leading to misfit 
in the proposed model. With this change, the model was tested using maximum likelihood 
estimation. The initial results indicated poor fit to the data, (2 (205) = 755.268, p < .001; 
RMSEA = 0.089; CFI = 0.83; SRMR = .063); however, this initial model yielded several 
Modification Index (M.I.) values greater than 10. During the model respecification process, 
several within scale error variances were allowed to correlate. Specifically, the within-scale error 
variances with the largest M.I. value was allowed to correlate, and then the model was re-
analyzed in Mplus. This process was repeated until the Mplus software no longer indicated 
within-scale error variance M.I. values greater than 10. Eight paths were freed for the anxiety 
scale and eight for the motivation scale. After respecification, the model had adequate fit to the 
data (2(189) = 344.228, p < .001; RMSEA = .058; CFI = .952; SRMR = .051), supporting the 
proposed structural and measurement models. Factor pattern loadings for the two latent 
variables, test anxiety (α = .899) and test motivation (α =.929), can be found in Table 1.  Table 2 
shows path model estimates, and Figure 2 shows the updated model with path estimates. Table 3 







Latent Variable CFAs (standardized factor pattern loadings) 
 
Item Estimate SE p 
Test Anxiety (α = .899) 
anx1 0.796 0.031 <.001 
anx2 0.783 0.036 <.001 
anx3 0.730 0.034 <.001 
anx4 0.658 0.042 <.001 
anx5 0.699 0.041 <.001 
anx6 0.666 0.041 <.001 
anx7 0.585 0.046 <.001 
anx8 0.693 0.039 <.001 
anx9 0.498 0.051 <.001 
anx10 0.585 0.046 <.001 
Test Motivation (α = .929) 
moti1 0.640 0.043 <.001 
moti2 0.817 0.030 <.001 
moti3 0.776 0.033 <.001 
moti4 0.791 0.025 <.001 
moti5 0.828 0.029 <.001 
moti6 0.744 0.034 <.001 
moti7 0.764 0.031 <.001 
moti8 0.676 0.035 <.001 
moti9 0.741 0.034 <.001 







Direct and Indirect Effects (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
 
Hypothesis Path      Estimate     SE      p 95% CI* 
Unstandardized Direct Effects 
1 Cond to PL -3.003 1.492 0.044 [-5.930, -0.106] 
2 Cond to Moti -0.022 0.065 0.731 [-0.146,  0.110] 
3 Cond to Anx -0.146 0.101 0.147 [-0.340,  0.057] 
4 PL to Moti 0.005 0.003 0.041 [0.000 ,  0.011] 
5 PL to Anx -0.146 0.101 0.147 [-0.005,  0.012] 
Standardized Direct Effects† 
1 Cond to PL -0.221 0.106 0.038 [-0.420, -0.004] 
2 Cond to Moti -0.039 0.112 0.731 [-0.256,  0.185] 
3 Cond to Anx -0.171 0.119 0.152 [-0.398,  0.068] 
4 PL to Moti 0.128 0.058 0.027 [0.009 ,  0.236] 
5 PL to Anx 0.055 0.068 0.419 [-0.076,  0.189] 
Indirect Effects 
6 Moti thru PL -0.028 0.018  [-0.078 ,-0.002] 
7 Anx thru PL -0.012 0.018  [-0.064 , 0.012] 
  Note. STDY standardization; * = Bias corrected bootstrapped CIs; Cond = condition; PL = Perceived Length; 








Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 336) 
 
   
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Condition 0.52 0.50 -     
2. Perceived length 23.93 13.63 -.11 -    
3. Actual length 34.05 17.08 -.03 .66 -   
4. Test anxiety 2.79 0.56 -.032 .07 .00 (.90)  
5. Test motivation 3.62 0.41 -.005 .14 .17 -.08  (.93) 





All hypotheses were testing using maximum likelihood estimation and bias-corrected 
boot-strapped confidence intervals (see Table 2).  Unstandardized effects are reported for 
Hypothesis 1 because the effect size is most interpretable without standardization: game-frame as 
a dummy coded experimental manipulation and perceived length as a time in minutes. 
Hypotheses 2, 3, 6, and 7 are criterion-standardized, because it is inappropriate to standardize a 
binary independent variable (i.e., condition), yet standardizing the dependent variables (i.e., 
continuous latent variables) is necessary for interpretation. Hypotheses 4 and 5 were also 
criterion-standardized because of the regression of outcomes on the perceived length variable 
(time in minutes).   
Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative relationship between game-framing and perceived 
length. The data supported this prediction (b = -3.003, p = .044). Specifically, as condition 
changes from assessment-frame to game-frame, participants’ perceptions of time passage is 
lessened by three minutes. Post-hoc analysis further supported this hypothesis by providing 
evidence that the difference in time-length perception were not due to actual time differences 
between conditions. The average completion time in the assessment frame (M = 34.56, SD = 
18.22) and the average completion time in the game-frame (M = 33.58, SD = 16.01) were not 
significantly different t(334) = 0.526, p = .599. To further investigate these results, a follow up 
SEM analysis in Mplus was run, specifying completion time as a mediator between game-
framing (condition) and perceived length. Actual and perceived time were related (b = .527, p 
= .000); however, even controlling for that effect, there was still an observed relationship 
between perceived time and condition (b = -0.485, p = .025).  Thus, Hypothesis 1 appears robust 
to alternative explanations related to differences in actual time spent across conditions. 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between game-framing and test motivation. 
The data did not support this prediction (β = -0.039, p = 0.731). In fact, there was a slight 
negative relationship, indicating that participants in the game-frame condition reported .039 SDs 
lower on the test motivation scale. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative relationship between game-framing and test anxiety. 
The results did not support this prediction; however, this may be because the effect was smaller 
than expected (β = -0.171, p = 0.152). The data indicate that participants in the game-frame 
condition reported .171 SDs lower on the test anxiety scale. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a negative relationship between perceived length and test 
motivation. The results did not support this prediction (β = 0.128, p = 0.027). Indeed, the data 
indicated a strong positive relationship between the two variables, meaning that as perceived 
length increased by one minute, reported test motivation increased by 0.128 SDs. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive relationship between perceived length and test anxiety. 
The data did not support this (β = 0.055, p = 0.419).  For each one-minute increase in perceived 
length, participants only reported a .055 increase in test anxiety, below the standards for either 
statistical or practical significance. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that perceived length would partially mediate the relationship 
between game-framing and test motivation. The data supported this proposition (β = -0.028), 
95% CI [-0.078, -0.002], supporting a small indirect effect of game-framing on test motivation 
via its intermediary effect on perceived length. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that perceived length would partially mediate the relationship 
between game-framing and test anxiety. The results did not support this hypothesis (β = -0.012), 
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95% CI [-0.064, 0.012], suggesting that the indirect effect of game-framing through anxiety is 





Figure 2. Conceptual model with path estimates. * p < .05, The covariance between Anxiety and 
Motivation is XY standardized, the effect of game-frame on perceived-length is unstandardized, 

















This study makes six primary contributions.  First, it theorizes and tests a direct effect of 
game-framing on time-length estimations of a cognitive battery, which has key implications for 
gamification research and applicant reactions theorists. Isolating the effects of game-framing sets 
a foundation for future researchers to parse out its individual causal effects, in response to 
current recommendations to improve the gamification literature (Seaborn and Fels, 2014). In 
comparison to the Lieberoth (2015) study—in which the framing intervention also involved the 
inclusion of game pieces and a game board—the effects observed here are modest yet 
meaningful. Lieberoth found a large effect for game-framing on the interest/enjoyment facet of 
the IMI but reported no significant differences on the other scale dimensions or the overall scale. 
In contrast, the present study found a relatively small effect (r = -.11) for framing on time 
perceptions. Whereas the effects in the Lieberoth study could have been caused by a game board 
or game pieces effect combined with the framing effect, the framing effect in the present study 
has been much more clearly isolated. The validity of the framing effect was further supported 
with a post-hoc analysis that did not find significant differences in actual completion times 
between groups; in short, although time perceptions changed, actual time spent did not. 
Additionally, insofar as applicant reactions researchers wish perceived length to remain in the 
applicant reactions model, there is now a demonstrated intervention that can affect time-length 
perceptions of cognitive ability tests. 
Second, this study provides evidence contrary to the theoretically suggested direction of 
the relationship between time perceptions and motivation. Perceived length had a small positive 
relationship with test motivation, meaning that those who perceived the tests as taking more time 
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also reported higher levels of motivation. In contrast, Gable and Poole (2012) reported increases 
in approach motivation along with decreases in time perception in three different experiments. 
From that study, it was expected that individuals who started off highly motivated to complete 
the survey would consequently experience time faster. However, the data revealed the opposite 
relationship.   
Third, this study provides the first empirical test of perceived length (PL) as a variable in 
the applicant reactions model, and its relationship was in the opposite direction expected. The 
present study represents, to my knowledge, the first empirical test of PL in the applicant 
reactions literature.  In a meta-analytic test of the theoretical applicant reactions model, 
Hausknecht et al. (2004, Figure 1) list length of process as an example of a perceived procedure 
characteristic; however, PL was never measured or reported in any meta-analyses they identified 
(Hausknecht et al., 2004, Table 2). Ryan and Ployhart (2000) mentioned that applicants who 
perceive a selection procedure as overly time-consuming may be demotivated to perform during 
that procedure. Beyond these two papers, PL does not appear to have been tested in AR theory. 
Thus, a key contribution of the present study is the test of empirical relationships between 
perceived length and two applicant perceptions, test motivation and test anxiety.  
Fourth, several relationships and paths theoretically indicated by applicant reactions 
theory were not found, demonstrating a need for further research. The relationship between PL 
and test anxiety (β = 0.055, p = 0.419) was statistically and practically insignificant. Simply put, 
the data do not indicate a meaningful relationship between perceived length of cognitive ability 
tests (or puzzles) and test anxiety. The relationship between PL and test motivation (β = 0.128, p 
= 0.027), although significant and in the range of other relationships between perceived 
procedure characteristics and applicant perceptions (cf. Hausknecht et al., 2004), is in the 
31 
 
opposite direction than that suggested by AR theory. If, as suggested by Ryan and Ployhart 
(2004), increases in perceived length cause decreases in motivation, this relationship should be 
negative. Perceived length did not mediate the relationship between game-framing and test 
anxiety (β = -0.012), 95% CI [-0.064, 0.012], although game-framing did have an effect on PL (b 
= -3.003, p = .044). Thus, several relationships contained within the AR theoretical model were 
not observed in the present study.  
There are two potential theoretical explanations for this. First, perceived length may in 
fact relate to motivation and anxiety differently than expected or may have a more complex 
relationship with outcomes than simple linearity.  For example, this relationship could be 
moderated by the test length, such that a longer battery with more questions could be perceived 
differently than the relatively short battery used in the present study. If so, the effects of actual 
test length on perceived temporal length and test motivation should be considered for inclusion 
in the AR model. Second, changes in computerized testing may have changed expectations about 
length in the sixteen years since Ryan and Ployhart suggested the relationship.  Specifically, the 
use of computers for employment testing has become a norm. In contrast, the studies included in 
Hausknecht et al. (2004) are often from the early and mid-1990’s. Some of those studies were 
almost certainly conducted using pencil and paper tests, and those administered on computers 
were administered to test-takers who likely have a fundamentally different relationship with 
computers in general and computerized testing in particular. It is plausible that the relationship 
between time perception and motivation while computing is different than otherwise. 
The fifth contribution of this paper is that it revealed an indirect effect of game-framing 
on motivation via perceived length (β = -0.028, 95% CI [-0.078, -0.002]), supporting AR theory 
more broadly and setting the foundation for future studies of stronger gamification 
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interventions. . The point estimate of an indirect effect is difficult to interpret (Hayes, 2009), but 
this finding does indicate that game-framing, perceived length, and test motivation are linked, 
and that their relationships are consistent with the causal AR model suggested by Hausknecht et 
al. (2004).  The direction of these relationships, however, requires further research. 
The final contribution of this paper is that game-framing did not have a direct effect on 
either test anxiety or test motivation. Game-framing did not significantly affect test anxiety or 
test motivation. These results were surprising, especially in light of game-framing’s apparent 
effect on perceived length. Specifically, since that effect was observed, it indicates that 
participants in the game-frame condition did indeed perceive the cognitive tests as puzzles and 
games. However, even though the framing effect seems to have worked, it did not affect key test-
taking variables. 
Limitations 
Neither game-framing nor perceived length demonstrated a statistically significant 
relationship with test anxiety. This result does not support the greater applicant reactions model; 
however, these data should be interpreted with caution. The experiment may not have simulated 
the psychological environment of an actual selection context. In order to maximize the game-
framing effect, participants were not told until after the cognitive tests were completed to think 
of their performance in the context of employee selection. Thus, the levels of anxiety, 
competitiveness, and need present during cognitive testing for selection purposes may not have 
been present in either condition. Furthermore, Mturk workers, who often fill out online surveys, 
may be more comfortable doing so than a typical job applicant. Their levels of test anxiety may 
be generally lower than the greater population of applicants and other test-takers. Lastly, the 
sample consisted mostly of full-time workers with an average job-tenure of 7.47 years. The 
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typical respondent in this sample may be so far removed from the application process that they 
did not experience anxieties more common among those having more recently entered the 
workforce, a common sample for prior applicant reactions studies. 
Additionally, perceived length and motivation may have a non-recursive relationship 
such that time-perception affects motivation and motivation also affects time perceptions. This 
relationship is not dictated by the AR model, but is logically sound and follows from research in 
other areas of psychology. Levels of approach motivation may affect time perceptions, as 
suggested by Gable and Poole (2012), while tests that seem overly long can demotivate 
applicants, as suggested by Ryan and Ployhart (2000). To address this, some researchers have 
employed a reward system (e.g., Guillory & Hancock, 2012). A replication of the present study, 
in which the instructions read “top performers will be awarded a $100 gift card” may help to 
recreate the psychological realism of high-stakes testing. To increase generalizability, an 
organization could attempt a game-framing manipulation among actual applicants. However, this 
may be risky given the current lack of research into other outcomes in the AR model such as 
offer-acceptance intentions, withdrawal intentions, and willingness to recommend to others. 
The three-dimensional rotation task was exceptionally difficult for participants. Forty-six 
percent did not get a single item right. As such, it is possible that this task differentially affected 
motivation and anxiety in the present sample. Specifically, if the unusual difficulty of the task 
caused participants to become bored or otherwise reduce their effort across conditions, the 
inclusions of this test may have attenuated motivation and anxiety, reducing variance available to 
test hypothesized effects.  This therefore represents a threat to the internal validity of the study.  
However, because this was only one test of several in the battery, it is suspected that any test-
specific effects on the outcome variables would have been mitigated by the experience of the full 
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test battery.  Even if the effect of the high difficulty of this test on motivation or anxiety was 
substantial in effect magnitude, the outcome variables as measured appeared normally distributed 
and with means in the expected range.  Thus the overall impact of the inclusion of this variable 
appears minimal but should be considered carefully in future research incorporating this test 
battery with similar populations. 
The present sample was nonhomogeneous in terms of employment. Specifically, a 
portion of the participants were unemployed (N = 76), which potentially limits generalizability to 
the employed population. However, a post hoc SEM analysis excluding the unemployed sample 
(N = 260), revealed no major differences in model fit or in path estimates. Thus, it seems that 
employment status does not affect the relationships observed in the present study. 
Future Directions 
The findings of this experiment indicate that other (i.e., non-selection) tasks and activities 
could be similarly game-framed to modify time-perceptions. Cognitive ability tests were chosen 
due to their importance in employee selection, but also because many of them seem like puzzles 
or riddles. It is unknown if the effect on PL is present for other measures that are not as naturally 
game-like, and this should be explored in future research. Similarly, other forms of framing 
should be studied in this context. For example, changes in the type font and graphical 
presentation are forms of gamification that could reframe perceptions of test-takers (Downes-Le 
Guin et al., 2012). Although it would be beneficial to study individual time-length perceptions on 
a variety of tests, researchers should note that once participants are asked to think about time, 
their perception of time is thereafter altered for the duration of the study (Wearden, 2005); given 
this, examining multiple methods of assessing time perception and looking for convergence 




The results of this study progress scholarly understanding of gamification in general and 
in the context selection testing. The data indicate that simply calling something a game makes it 
seem to take less time, highlighting the effects of game-framing by isolating the effects of a 
single game element. Furthermore, the experiment represents, to my knowledge, the first study to 
empirically evaluate time-perception in the context of AR theory. The results indicate that 
applicant reaction researchers may need to re-evaluate the specific relationships between 
perceived length of process and core applicant perceptions in the overall AR model.  
A core idea in the present study is that game-elements should be isolated to parse their 
effects. This idea can and should be replicated in the field of gamification research. The shotgun 
approach, in which multiple game-elements are applied and then afterword interpreted in context 
of their combined effects, does not further our understanding of how to use gamification in a 
practical sense. Game elements such as narrative, competition, graphics, or points, should be first 
isolated in empirical studies (Seaborn and Fels, 2014). Once game elements’ singular effects are 
known, they can then be combined with other single elements to consider interactive effects. It is 
only through studies like these that gamification will one day be understood well enough for 
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APPENDIX B  
LETTER AND NUMBER SERIES SAMPLE ITEM 
LN.01 (q_12001) 
In the following number series, what number comes next? 64, 81, 100, 121, 
144, ... 













APPENDIX D  







VERBAL REASONING SAMPLE ITEM 
VR.31 (q_12031) 
Isaac is shorter than George and Phillip is taller than George. Which of the following statements 
is most accurate? 
(1) Phillip is taller than Isaac (2) Phillip is shorter than Isaac (3) Phillip is as tall as Isaac (4) It is 
impossible to tell (5) Isaac is taller than George (6) George is taller than Phillip (7) None of these 





TEST ATTITUDES SURVEY 
1. Motivation 
a. Doing well on this test (or these tests) is important to me. 
b. I wanted to do well on this test or tests. 
c. I tried my best on this test or tests. 
d. I tried to do the very best I could to on this test or tests. 
e. While taking this test or tests, I concentrated and tried to do well. 
f. I want to be among the top scorers on this test (or these tests). 
g. I pushed myself to work hard on this test or these tests. 
h. I was extremely motivated to do well on this test or tests. 
i. * I just didn’t care how I did on this test or tests. 
j. * I didn’t put much effort into this test or tests. 
2. Lack of Concentration 
a. It was hard to keep my mind on this test or tests. 
b. I found myself losing interest and not paying attention to the test. 
c. During the test session, I was bored. 
d. I get distracted when taking tests of this type. 
3. Belief in Tests 
a. * This test or tests was a good reflection of what a person could do in the job. 
b. * Tests are a good way of selecting people into jobs. 
c. This kind of test or tests should be eliminated. 
d. I don’t believe that tests are valid.  
4. Comparative Anxiety 
a. I probably didn’t do as well as most of the other people who took these tests. 
b. I am not good at taking tests. 
c. During the testing, I often thought about how poorly I was doing. 
d. I usually get very anxious about taking tests. 
e. * I usually do pretty well on tests. 
f. * I expect to be among the people who score really well on this test. 
g. My test scores don’t usually reflect my true abilities. 
h. I very much dislike taking tests of this type. 
i. During the test or tests, I found myself thinking of the consequences of failing. 
j. During the testing, I got so nervous I couldn’t do as well as I should have. 
5. Test Ease 
a. This test was (or these tests were) too easy for me. 
b. I found this test or tests too simple. 
c. * I found this test or tests interesting and challenging. 
d. * I felt frustrated because many of the test questions were too difficult. 
6. External Attribution 
a. I became fatigued and tired during the testing. 
b. The questions on this test or tests were ambiguous and unclear. 




d. While taking the test or tests, I was preoccupied with how much time I had left. 
e. I felt a lot of time pressure when taking this test or tests. 
7. General Need Achievement 
a. Once I undertake a task, I usually push myself to my limits. 
b. I try to do well in everything I undertake. 
c. * In general, I like to work just hard enough to get by. 
8. Future Effects 
a. * My performance on this test will not affect my chances for obtaining a job or 
gaining a promotion. 
b. Scores from this test or tests will probably affect my future. 
c. These test scores will be used in future decisions made about me. 
9. Preparation 
a. I spent a good deal of time preparing for this test or tests. 
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